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Abstract
The introduction of hospital reimbursement based on diagnosis related groups (DRG)
in 2004 has been a conspicuous attempt to increase hospital e±ciency in the German
health sector. In this paper changes of hospital e±ciency, quanti¯ed as a Malmquist index
decomposition in pure technical e±ciency change, are analyzed for periods before and after
the reform. We implement a two-stage semi-parametric e±ciency model that allows for
spatial interdependence among hospitals. The results reveal an enhancement in overall
e±ciency after the DRG introduction. Moreover, an increase in the magnitude of negative
spatial spillovers among German hospital performance can be diagnosed. This result is in
line with a rise of competition for (low cost) patients.
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11 Introduction
The German health sector is characterized by a steady increase of hospital expenditures. It has
doubled from 1991 to 2007, reaching almost 60 billion Euro in 2007 (Statistisches Bundesamt,
2008). This amounts to around 2.5% of the German gross domestic product (GDP). Until 2004
German hospitals have been reimbursed by per diem payments. This system has invoked incen-
tives to hospitalize patients as long as possible, likely resulting in an ine±cient use of resources.
In December 1999 the left-wing government announced the introduction of a prospective pay-
ment system based on diagnosis related groups (DRG) in 2004 as an attempt to increase the
e±ciency of hospitals (e.g. Hensen et al., 2008 and Lungen and Lapsley, 2003). Under the
DRG based ¯nancing system hospitals receive a ¯xed rate for each admission depending on a
patient's diagnosis. If the costs for a particular case are lower (higher) than the reimbursement,
the hospital realizes pro¯ts (losses). As a consequence, hospitals face an increased pressure on
their ¯nancial performance and a higher risk of insolvency.
The e®ects of the reform on hospital e±ciency in Germany have not been evaluated em-
pirically yet. However, some consequences can be expected. Under the prospective payment
system it is pro¯table to decrease the lengths of stay and to increase simultaneously the number
of treated cases. Evidence for such behavioral adjustments of hospitals is given for dermatolog-
ical hospital admissions by Hensen et al. (2008). Furthermore, BÄ ocking et al. (2005) mention
that hospitals preferably treat cases with high reimbursement rates and a low level of complex-
ity. This implies relatively less resource usage in comparison with treating patients with the
same diagnosis but higher level of complexity. A hospital which is successful in attracting so
called low cost patients (e.g. due to reputation, bribery1) might show a better performance
than its neighbor hospitals. Hence, a rise of competition for low cost patients could be re°ected
by an increased negative spatial interdependence of hospital e±ciency.
The aim of this study is to subject two hypotheses about potential e®ects of the ¯nancial
reform on overall hospital performance and spatial interdependence to empirical testing. In par-
ticular, ¯rstly, we examine if hospitals have realized e±ciency gains and, secondly, if stronger
1In Germany in summer 2009, there was an a®air about bribery payments from several hospitals to primary
care physicians for the admission of low cost patients.
2negative spatial interdependence of hospital e±ciency has emerged after the DRG reform. For
this purpose a spatial two-stage semi-parametric e±ciency model is implemented. In the ¯rst
stage, hospital e±ciency is quanti¯ed by means of the non-parametric Data Envelopment Anal-
ysis (DEA). To identify e±ciency gains as a consequence of changes in the hospital incentive
structure, we determine the Malmquist index decomposition in pure technical e±ciency change,
which is not a®ected by technological progress and scale adjustments (e.g. Burgess and Wilson,
1995 and Sommersguter-Reichmann, 2000). In a second stage, potential e®ects of the DRG
reform on hospital e±ciency change and spatial spillovers among hospital e±ciency are inves-
tigated by means of a parametric spatially autoregressive model with spatially autoregressive
disturbances (SARAR). An unbalanced cross-section of around 1500 German hospitals is ana-
lyzed over 12 years (1995 to 2006) covering the DRG announcement and introduction period.
The results show an enhancement in overall e±ciency. Moreover, an increase in the magnitude
of negative spatial spillovers among German hospital performance can be diagnosed. This result
is in line with an expected rise of competition for (low cost) patients invoked by the prospective
payment system.
In Section 2, the two hypotheses about potential e®ects of the ¯nancial reform on overall
hospital performance and spatial interdependence are put forth. Section 3 sketches the measure-
ment of e±ciency and e±ciency change, the SARAR model and the empirical testing strategy
and describes the data. Empirical results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. An
appendix delivers methodological details for Section 3.
2 E®ects of the ¯nancial reform
The introduction of the DRG based ¯nancing system in 2004 has been intended to increase
hospital e±ciency by changing the incentive structure (e.g. Hensen et al., 2008, BÄ ocking et al.,
2005 and Lungen and Lapsley, 2003). The empirical evidence for e±ciency gains after the DRG
reform, obtained for various countries is, however, not fully conclusive. For the cases of Norway
(BiÄ orn et al., 2010 and BiÄ orn et al., 2003), Portugal (Dismuke and Sena, 1999) and Finland
(Linna, 2000), positive e®ects of the DRG introduction on hospital e±ciency have been found.
3In the same time no e®ect is detected for the case of Austria (Sommerguters-Reichmann, 2000).
To examine the intended e±ciency enhancement of German hospitals, we analyze the change of
technical e±ciency during the period from 1995 to 2006. Hence, the sample starts in a pre-reform
period and covers both the announcement (at the end of 1999) and the introduction (2004) of
the reform. If there is any e®ect of the reform, we expect e±ciency gains after these particular
dates. Hospital e±ciency improvements should be interpreted as a response to the changed
incentives, because of two reasons. Firstly, we use the Malmquist index decomposition in pure
technical e±ciency change, which is invariant to changes of technology and scale adjustments
(e.g. Burgess and Wilson, 1995 and Sommersguter-Reichmann, 2000). Secondly, there have
been no other major exogenous shocks a®ecting hospital e±ciency during the sample period.
We formalize the following hypothesis
² H(A): The announcement (2000) or introduction (2004) of the DRG based ¯nancing
system has been followed by improvements of hospital e±ciency.
As Ellis (1998) points out in a theoretical equilibrium approach, under prospective payment,
health providers dump the most severely ill patients and compete to attract low cost patients.
The latter are characterized by a low level of complexity and an expected relatively short
hospital stay. Empirical evidence for an implicit patient selection after the shift to a prospective
payment system is found for the US by Norton et al. (2002) and Ellis and McGuire (1996).
Hospitals which are successful in attracting low cost patients in the nearby area use relatively
less resources in comparison with hospitals treating patients of the same area with the same
diagnosis but higher levels of complexity. These cases might be characterized by prolonged
hospital stays. Hence, the performance of two contiguous hospitals is expected to be negatively
correlated if one of the two competes (more successful) in the described way. Then, strengthened
competition for low cost patients could be re°ected by an increased magnitude of negative spatial
interdependence of hospital e±ciency. This leads to the hypothesis
² H(B): The announcement (2000) or introduction (2004) of the DRG based ¯nancing sys-
tem has been followed by an increase in the magnitude of negative spatial interdependence
of hospital e±ciency.
43 Methodology
In this Section, we sketch the spatial two-stage semi-parametric e±ciency model. In the ¯rst
stage, DEA e±ciency scores and the Malmquist index decomposition in pure technical e±ciency
change are determined. In the second stage a parametric SARAR regression model is imple-
mented. Furthermore, this Section illustrates the empirical testing strategies for the hypotheses
H(A) and H(B). Potential e®ects of the DRG reform on hospital e±ciency gains (H(A)) are
investigated by means of a regression of logarithmic pure technical e±ciency change. We imple-
ment an unbalanced panel data model with time dummy variables, while controlling for hidden
and observable heterogeneity across hospitals in form of ¯xed e®ects and explanatory variables,
respectively. An enhancement of e±ciency is identi¯ed by testing for increasing time e®ects.
The second hypothesis (H(B)) is examined by means of spatial cross-sectional regressions of
logarithmic DEA e±ciency scores. Spatial spillover estimates are then tested for a decrease over
time. Moreover, the data and the construction of relevant variables used for the analysis are
described in this Section.
3.1 Hospital e±ciency and the Malmquist decomposition
Hospital e±ciency is estimated in a ¯rst step by means of the non-parametric DEA. In this
framework, the production or cost function does not require an explicit speci¯cation. Thus,
assumptions about pro¯t-maximization or cost-minimization behavior, which might be inap-
propriate for (non-pro¯t) hospitals (Zweifel et al., 2009), can be avoided. The input-based DEA
e±ciency score of hospital i, µC
i;t1jt2, is obtained under the assumption of constant returns to
scale through a comparison of its set of inputs and outputs of period t1 to that of all hospitals
in period t2, where t1;t2 2 ft¡1;tg. The measure denotes the radial distance of the i-th hospital
at time t1 to the frontier function at time t2, which is determined from a linear combination of
the best practicing (e±cient) units in t2. As shown by Kneip et al. (1998) the DEA e±ciency
scores are consistent estimates for the true e±ciency scores (details are given in Appendix A).
The input-based Malmquist index of e±ciency change from t¡1 to t is the geometric mean
of the change in e±ciency under both frontier functions in t¡1 and t. For the i-th hospital the



































In (1), ECi;t measures the movement over time of hospital i towards the frontier function and
represents a change in e±ciency (FÄ are et al., 1992). Moreover, TCi;t is the geometric mean
of the change in e±ciency under changing technology given the production bundles of t ¡ 1
and t, and indicates a shift in the constant returns to scale technology. The e±ciency change
























i;t1jt2 is the respective e±ciency score under variable returns to scale (Banker et al.,
1984). The pure e±ciency change, PECi;t, measures the relative e±ciency enhancement and is
invariant to changes in the technology and scale adjustments (Burgess and Wilson, 1995 and
Sommersguter-Reichmann, 2000). For the ease of interpretation, we consider the inverse of






By construction, values above (below) unity indicate an improvement (regress) in e±ciency.
DEA scores are constrained to the interval (0;1], with 1 indicating an e±cient hospital. To
avoid the censoring problem in the second stage regression analysis, we compute super e±ciency
scores by means of the tie-breaking procedure proposed by Andersen and Petersen (1993). For
this purpose, the e±cient units are ranked according to the amount by which their input vectors
could be increased without becoming ine±cient. To compare hospitals with distinct exogenously
6¯xed input variables we account for non-discretionary input variables (Banker and Morey, 1986).
Due to the deterministic nature of DEA, measurement errors for observations of the reference
set can distort the estimated e±ciency scores for all hospitals (e.g. Wilson, 1995). Similarly,
hospitals performing particularly poor might also invalidate the second stage regression results.
Therefore, we apply an outlier detection proposed by Johnson and McGinnis (2008) to identify
hospitals having an outstandingly good or poor performance. Hospitals are treated as an e±cient
outlier if it is possible to double the inputs without becoming ine±cient. An ine±cient outlier
is detected if a convex-combination of worst performing hospitals can produce the same level of
output using half the inputs. Outlying hospitals are excluded from the analysis.2
3.2 The spatial regression model
The rationale about spatial interdependence among German hospital performance leads to the
conjecture that spatial dependence might similarly characterize changes of hospital e±ciency.
Thus, for both variables, µV
i;tjt and °it, we implement a SARAR model to account for two distinct
channels of spatial dependence simultaneously. On the one hand, negative spatial spillovers
might occur due to the competition for low cost patients and, on the other hand, positive
spatial dependence could be the result of similar unobservable factors of nearby observations.
As mentioned above, °it is analyzed in an unbalanced ¯xed e®ects panel and µV
i;tjt in a cross-
sectional model framework. Both models read in time t as
yt = ¸W tyt + Zt¯ + et; with et = ½Mtet + ²t; t = 1;:::;T; (2)
where yt is an N £ 1 vector comprising the variables of interest, i.e. the logarithm of pure
technical e±ciency change, yt = (ln(°1t);:::;ln(°Nt))
0, or the logarithm of DEA e±ciency scores,
yt = (ln(µV
1;tjt);:::;ln(µV
N;tjt))0, Zt is an N £K matrix of observations of K explanatory variables
and ¯ a K £ 1 vector of parameters. The pattern of spatial dependence is captured by the
N £ N spatial weights matrices W t and Mt with zero diagonal elements and row normalized
2As it turns out, the empirical testing results of H(A) and H(B) are qualitatively similar for alternative
threshold values for the outlier detection.
7constants (such that each row sums to unity). The number of hospitals, N, varies with t, since
some hospitals are not observed over all time periods. The spatial lag coe±cient ¸ measures
the direct e®ect of the weighted neighboring observations on the elements in yt (Anselin, 1988).
Spatial dependence due to similar unobservable factors of nearby observations is quanti¯ed by
the spatial autocorrelation coe±cient ½. Both spatial parameters are restricted to be less than
unity in absolute value. Finally, ²t is an N £ 1 vector of location speci¯c i.i.d. disturbances,
²t » N(0;¾2IN), where IN is the N-dimensional identity matrix. Adding time and individual
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coe±cients of the time dummy variables, ±t, are collected in ± = (±2;:::;±T)
0, where t = 1 is the
benchmark, 0t and ¶t is an Nt£1 vector of zeros and ones, respectively, where Nt is the number




is an Nt £1 vector comprising the individual e®ects of the Nt hospitals. These are dropped out
by means of the within transformation. The panel and cross-sectional models are estimated by
means of a Maximum Likelihood approach3 (see Appendix B for a formal representation of the
likelihood function).
3.3 Empirical testing strategy of DRG Hypotheses
While controlling for observable and hidden hospital heterogeneity, the period after the DRG
announcement or introduction should be characterized by a signi¯cant rise of °it under H(A).
3Simar and Wilson (2007) mention that in ¯nite samples the estimated e±ciency scores are biased and serially
correlated in a complicated fashion. The convergence rate of µV
i;tjt depends on the number of inputs and outputs
and is typically lower than the parametric convergence rate. Therefore the serial correlation and the bias itself,
disappear asymptotically with the same rate as µV
i;tjt converges. Maximum Likelihood estimates of regressions of
µV
i;tjt are consistent, but inference based on the inverse of the negative Hessian of the log-likelihood is generally
invalid. To overcome this problem, we apply a bootstrap procedure suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007).
However, the di®erence between the bootstrap and asymptotic results is negligible.
8The hypothesis is examined by testing for signi¯cant increases of the means of the time dummy
coe±cients of 5 subperiods. In particular, to verify an announcement e®ect (AE), the pre-
announcement period (SP1: 1996 to 1999) is compared with the post-announcement-pre-reform
period (SP2: 2000 to 2003). An introduction e®ect is evaluated by means of two alternative
strategies. The ¯rst approach (IE1) takes the AE into account and compares SP2 with the post-
reform period (SP3: 2004 to 2006). Secondly, the AE is neglected and the pre-reform period
(SP4: 1996 to 2003) is compared with SP3 (IE2). Finally, an overall e®ect (OE) is examined by
comparing SP1 with the post-announcement period (SP5: 2000 to 2006). The empirical testing
strategy can be summarized by the following hypotheses with the tested e®ects in parentheses
H
A1
0 : ¹ ±1 = ¹ ±2 vs: H
A1
1 : ¹ ±1 < ¹ ±2 (AE) (4)
H
A2
0 : ¹ ±2 = ¹ ±3 vs: H
A2
1 : ¹ ±2 < ¹ ±3 (IE1) (5)
H
A3
0 : ¹ ±4 = ¹ ±3 vs: H
A3
1 : ¹ ±4 < ¹ ±3 (IE2) (6)
H
A4
0 : ¹ ±1 = ¹ ±5 vs: H
A4
1 : ¹ ±1 < ¹ ±5 (OE); (7)
where ¹ ±1 = 1
4
P1999
t=1996 ±t (SP1), ¹ ±2 = 1
4
P2003
t=2000 ±t (SP2), ¹ ±3 = 1
3
P2006




(SP4), ¹ ±5 = 1
7
P2006
t=2000 ±t (SP5) and ±t is the time dummy coe±cient for the year t. The year
1996 serves as reference, i.e. ±1996 = 0. The hypotheses are tested by means of one-sided t-tests
based on the covariance matrix of estimated time e®ects.
Hypothesis H(B) suggests an increase of the magnitude of negative spatial spillovers ¸.
In order to test H(B) we ¯rstly apply a cross-sectional spatial regression of logarithmic DEA
e±ciency scores. Average spatial spillover estimates of SP1 to SP5 are then compared with each
other analogously to the procedure described for H(A).
3.4 Data and variable construction
3.4.1 The data set
The data are drawn from two distinct sources. Hospital data are extracted from the annual
hospital statistics collected by the statistical o±ces of the federal states (\Statistische Lan-
9desÄ amter"). It includes basic hospital characteristics, e.g. forms of ownership, the number
of beds, sta®, patients, etc., and data on the cost structure of the hospitals, as total costs,
payroll costs, material expenses etc. The district- and state-level data are obtained from
the \Regionaldatenbank Deutschland - GENESIS", which is administered by the statistical
o±ce of North Rhine-Westphalia (\Landesamt fÄ ur Datenverarbeitung und Statistik Nordrhein-
Westfalen"). Annual data cover the period from 1995 until 2006 and have been provided by
the \Forschungsdatenzentrum der Statistischen LandesÄ amter - Standort Kiel/Hamburg". In
Germany university hospitals are generally in charge of the education of young medical doctors
and research programmes. Thus, a comparison with other hospitals is rather di±cult. Therefore
university hospitals are not considered in the analysis. For each year, around 450 hospitals have
missing values for relevant variables or data inconsistencies, like declaring costs of less than 100
Euro or having zero-values for beds, physicians etc. These hospitals are also excluded from the
sample. Moreover, 0.3% (1996) to 1.9% (2001) and 0% (1995) to 0.9% (2003) of the hospitals
are detected as e±cient and ine±cient outliers, respectively, and removed from the analysis.
Finally, to facilitate the interpretation of the time e®ects, hospitals with less than 2 data points
are not included in the panel model.
3.4.2 Inputs and outputs
The input variables controlled by the hospitals are the amount of material expenses (in 2005
prices) (exp), the number of employed physicians (phys), nurses (nurses) and non-medical
employees (nonmed). Notably, the capacity of beds is imposed by the states for most hospitals
and therefore a non-controllable instrument for these hospitals. Accordingly, the number of
beds (beds) is treated as a non-discretionary input. For a hospital's output we take the number
of cases weighted for the respective average resource usage (wcases, Herr, 2008), which is
approximated by the nationwide average length of stay of patients treated in a particular clinical
department (details can be found in Appendix C). As a second output variable the number of
apprentices is considered (appr).4
4As a robustness check we have applied two further input speci¯cations. Firstly, the number of employees
are replaced by the expenses for labor. Secondly, in order to minimize measurement errors in the labor variables
103.4.3 Explanatory variables
To control for observable heterogeneity across hospitals, the following hospital- and district/state
level variables are selected.
Hospital speci¯c variables: A main ¯nding of hospital e±ciency studies for Germany
is a lower e±ciency in privately owned hospitals in comparison with their public counterparts
(e.g. Herr, 2008, Steinmann et al., 2004, and Helmig and Lapsley, 2001). To control for private
for pro¯t and non-pro¯t private hospitals respective dummy variables (private and non-profit)
are included. We explore the impact on hospital e±ciency of the market share, ms, which is
obtained as the number of patients of a hospital relative to competitors located in the same
district. Town and Vistnes (2001) and Dranove and Ludwick (1999) con¯rm that higher market
shares reduce costs or raise pro¯ts due to improvements of the hospital's bargaining power.
Hospitals usually do not adjust their working sta® promptly in response to changes in the
number of treated patients. Thus, hospitals with a relatively low occupancy rate (occrate) are
expected to have an oversized sta® that is unlikely to meet the current demand for inpatient care
e±ciently. The mortality rate (mort) is used as a proxy for poor quality (e.g. Propper et al.,
2004). Di®erences in the hospitals' budgets are controlled by total expenses (in 2005 prices) per
bed (budget). The management of hospitals with a more complex service-structure is likely to
face additional di±culties to organize the production e±ciently (e.g. Farsi and Filippini, 2008,
and Lee et al., 2008). The degree of specialization (spec) is measured by an information theory
index (Evans and Walker, 1972) in terms of di®erences between the national and hospital's
proportions of cases belonging to several clinical departments.
District/state speci¯c variables: Treatments of older people are likely to be more cost-
and resource-intensive, because they are often accompanied with higher degrees of comorbidity
and complications (Augurzky et al., 2006). Several authors (e.g. Herr, 2008, Chang, 1998)
address the in°uence of the patients' age structure on hospital e±ciency and ¯nd that higher
the number of full time equivalent employees are used instead of (crude) numbers of employees. However, for
this measure data are only available for physicians and non-physicians. Thus, this input speci¯cation might
neglect more heterogeneity across the hospitals in respect to their sta±ng mix in comparison with the initial
speci¯cation of number of employed physicians, nurses and non-medical employees. In summary, the results
regarding H(A) and H(B) are qualitatively very similar across all considered speci¯cations.
11proportions of older patients increase the ine±ciency. The fraction of people aged over 65 years
and living in a hospitals' district is considered as a demographic variable (age65). The degree
of the district's urbanization is captured by the population density (population per square
kilometer) (popdens) and exogenous socioeconomic factors are controlled by the district's GDP
per capita (gdp).
In each federal state of Germany, a commission composed of members of the state government
and health insurances creates the hospital requirement and ¯nancing plan (\Krankenhausbedarf-
splanung") for providing inpatient care to the population in the hospitals' service area (MÄ orsch,
2010). Hence, hospitals which are in the same state are confronted with the same regional legal
requirements. To account for this type of observable heterogeneity, we include state dummy vari-
ables, with North Rhine-Westphalia serving as reference. In the ¯xed e®ects speci¯cation any
type of time invariant heterogeneity between the hospitals cancels out by the within transforma-
tion. According to x 4 of the Hospital Financing Act (Krankenhaus¯nanzierungsgesetz-KHG)
the ¯nancial support in the German hospital sector is dualistic, i.e. operating costs are paid by
insurance companies, while investments are funded by federal states (x 9 KHG). Thus, ¯nancial
stress in the federal states could reduce the ¯nancial means for investments and might in°uence
the creation of the hospital requirement and ¯nancing plan. In the cross-sectional model, the
state dummy variables take into account all kinds of variations between the federal states. To
control for variations of the federal states' ¯nancial situation over time in the panel model, we
further include the debts of the federal states per GDP (debt).
3.4.4 Spatial weights matrices
To address robustness of the empirical results, two alternative weights matrices are used to









are built on binary matrices, with w¤
ijt = 1 and m¤
ijt = 1, if the i-th and the j-th hospital are
contiguous, respectively. The de¯nition of contiguity di®ers across alternative weights matrices.
The ¯rst concept, denoting Wd and Md, is to de¯ne hospitals as contiguous to each other if
they are located in the same district. For the second set of weights matrices, Wn and Mn, two
12hospitals are considered contiguous if they are either located in the same district, or if their
respective districts of residence are neighbors.
4 Results
Firstly, the results of the unbalanced ¯xed e®ects panel regression model of pure technical ef-
¯ciency change and diagnostic results for H(A) are considered. Afterwards, we turn to the
second hypothesis H(B) and discuss the results of the cross-sectional regression model of DEA
e±ciency scores. In order to gain additional information about spatial dependence in the data,
we also apply more parsimoniously parameterized model speci¯cations for both, the panel and
cross-sectional framework. A model neglecting spatial dependence is denoted by OLS, fur-
thermore the spatial error model (SEM), ¸ = 0 and the spatial lag model (SLM), ½ = 0 are
estimated. Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) for the variables included
in the empirical analyses and the number of hospitals entering the ¯rst (DEA and e±ciency
change) and second modeling stage (regression analysis) are documented in Table 1. Since there
are no substantial di®erences between the statistics of the explanatory variables of the panel
and cross-sectional model, they are only given for the panel regression model. For the regression
analysis some of the introduced regressors (ms, mort, occrate, budget, gdp, popdens and dept)
are measured in natural logarithms.
4.1 Pure technical e±ciency change panel model
Table 2 displays the results of the panel regression models explaining the pure technical e±ciency
change derived by DEA. First of all, the spatial regression models obtain higher log likelihood
statistics in comparison with OLS model evaluation. The best ¯t is achieved by means of the
SARAR model under Wd and Mn. The SEM and SARAR model yield signi¯cantly positive
spatial error correlation estimates if the spatial error process is modeled by means of Mn.
Spatial spillovers might have less importance to explain the pattern of hospital e±ciency change.
Applying the district spatial weights matrix for the spatial lag process the SARAR model
13Table 1: Mean values and standard deviations of selected variables
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hospitals (¯rst-stage: DEA) 20372 7569 7259 5544








hospitals (second-stage: e®. change) 17955 5660 6855 5440









































































hospitals (second-stage: panel model) 16097 5297 6116 4684
hospitals (second-stage: cross-sectional model) 18221 7032 6404 4785
Standard deviations in parentheses.
14Table 2: Regression results of unbalanced ¯xed e®ects panel models
OLS SEMj¸=0 SLMj½=0 SARAR
Md Mn Wd Wn Wd&Md Wn&Mn Wd&Mn Wn&Md
1997 0:734¤¤ 0:734¤¤ 0:732¤¤ 0:727¤¤ 0:598¤¤ 0:760¤¤ 0:729¤¤ 0:736¤¤ 0:600¤¤
1998 0:099¤¤ 0:099¤¤ 0:096¤¤ 0:098¤¤ 0:081¤¤ 0:102¤¤ 0:096¤¤ 0:096¤¤ 0:081¤¤
1999 0:002 0:002 ¡0:001 0:002 0:002 0:002 ¡0:001 ¡0:001 0:002
2000 0:098¤¤ 0:097¤¤ 0:091¤¤ 0:097¤¤ 0:080¤¤ 0:100¤¤ 0:091¤¤ 0:092¤¤ 0:080¤¤
2001 0:009 0:008 0:002 0:009 0:009 0:008 0:002 0:002 0:009
2002 ¡0:012 ¡0:013 ¡0:021 ¡0:012 ¡0:004 ¡0:015 ¡0:021 ¡0:022 ¡0:004
2003 0:177¤¤ 0:177¤¤ 0:164¤¤ 0:176¤¤ 0:153¤¤ 0:181¤¤ 0:164¤¤ 0:164¤¤ 0:153¤¤
2004 0:026 0:026 0:012 0:026 0:033¤ 0:024 0:013 0:012 0:033¤
2005 0:221¤¤ 0:221¤¤ 0:203¤¤ 0:220¤¤ 0:193¤¤ 0:225¤¤ 0:203¤¤ 0:203¤¤ 0:194¤¤
2006 0:374¤¤ 0:373¤¤ 0:353¤¤ 0:371¤¤ 0:320¤¤ 0:383¤¤ 0:352¤¤ 0:354¤¤ 0:320¤¤
private ¡0:011 ¡0:011 ¡0:009 ¡0:011 ¡0:010 ¡0:011 ¡0:009 ¡0:009 ¡0:011
non-profit ¡0:000 0:000 ¡0:000 ¡0:000 ¡0:000 0:001 ¡0:000 ¡0:000 ¡0:000
ln(ms) 0:065¤¤ 0:065¤¤ 0:064¤¤ 0:065¤¤ 0:064¤¤ 0:066¤¤ 0:064¤¤ 0:064¤¤ 0:064¤¤
spec ¡0:088¤¤ ¡0:088¤¤ ¡0:086¤¤ ¡0:088¤¤ ¡0:087¤¤ ¡0:087¤¤ ¡0:086¤¤ ¡0:086¤¤ ¡0:087¤¤
ln(mort) ¡0:040¤¤ ¡0:040¤¤ ¡0:040¤¤ ¡0:040¤¤ ¡0:040¤¤ ¡0:041¤¤ ¡0:040¤¤ ¡0:040¤¤ ¡0:040¤¤
ln(occrate) 0:150¤¤ 0:149¤¤ 0:152¤¤ 0:150¤¤ 0:150¤¤ 0:149¤¤ 0:152¤¤ 0:152¤¤ 0:149¤¤
ln(budget) ¡0:218¤¤ ¡0:216¤¤ ¡0:211¤¤ ¡0:217¤¤ ¡0:213¤¤ ¡0:215¤¤ ¡0:211¤¤ ¡0:211¤¤ ¡0:212¤¤
age65 ¡0:019¤¤ ¡0:020¤¤ ¡0:016¤¤ ¡0:019¤¤ ¡0:017¤¤ ¡0:020¤¤ ¡0:016¤¤ ¡0:016¤¤ ¡0:017¤¤
ln(gdp) ¡0:070 ¡0:070 ¡0:061 ¡0:071 ¡0:071 ¡0:068 ¡0:061 ¡0:061 ¡0:071
ln(popdens) 0:038 0:037 ¡0:007 0:037 0:012 0:039 ¡0:007 ¡0:008 0:012
ln(dept) ¡0:258¤¤ ¡0:257¤¤ ¡0:243¤¤ ¡0:255¤¤ ¡0:220¤¤ ¡0:266¤¤ ¡0:243¤¤ ¡0:245¤¤ ¡0:221¤¤
½ - 0:017¤ 0:247¤¤ - - 0:055¤¤ 0:243¤¤ 0:251¤¤ 0:003
¸ - - - 0:010 0:185¤¤ ¡0:039 0:004 ¡0:006 0:183¤¤
LOGLIKEa 148:5 150:2 171:6 149:1 168:0 151:5 171:6 171:8 168:0
R2
adj (in %) 44:79 44:81 44:56 44:01 30:26 47:97 44:19 45:02 30:41
spatial correlation tests
LMd
E 3:231¤ 0:002 0:001 0:640 0:106 0:034 0:002 0:377 0:000
LMd
L 1:158 0:354 0:266 0:001 0:365 0:001 0:274 0:009 0:825
LMn
E 63:383¤¤ 53:783¤¤ 0:372 57:640¤¤ 1:248 55:217¤¤ 0:358 0:357 1:218
LMn
L 49:968¤¤ 42:199¤¤ 0:001 44:796¤¤ 0:075 46:309¤¤ 0:000 0:009 0:078
average time e®ect estimates
¹ ±1 (96-99) 0:209 0:209 0:207 0:207 0:170 0:216 0:206 0:208 0:171
¹ ±2 (00-03) 0:068 0:067 0:059 0:067 0:059 0:068 0:059 0:059 0:059
¹ ±3 (04-06) 0:207 0:207 0:189 0:206 0:182 0:210 0:189 0:190 0:182
¹ ±4 (96-03) 0:158 0:158 0:152 0:157 0:131 0:163 0:151 0:153 0:132
¹ ±5 (00-06) 0:128 0:127 0:115 0:127 0:112 0:129 0:115 0:115 0:112
test statistics
¹ ±1 < ¹ ±2 (AE) 15:448 15:278 14:388 15:290 12:180 15:533 14:343 14:452 12:191
¹ ±2 < ¹ ±3 (IE1)¡12:779¤¤ ¡12:604¤¤ ¡10:701¤¤ ¡12:698¤¤ ¡11:268¤¤ ¡12:534¤¤ ¡10:710¤¤ ¡10:707¤¤ ¡11:254¤¤
¹ ±4 < ¹ ±3 (IE2) ¡4:816¤¤ ¡4:735¤¤ ¡3:626¤¤ ¡4:804¤¤ ¡4:705¤¤ ¡4:600¤¤ ¡3:646¤¤ ¡3:610¤¤ ¡4:691¤¤
¹ ±1 < ¹ ±5 (OE) 6:402 6:351 6:651 6:318 4:608 6:574 6:609 6:702 4:622
Signi¯cance level: ¤¤ 5%; ¤ 10%; a signi¯cance levels are given for log-likelihood ratio tests against
OLS; AE: Announcement e®ect; IE1: Introduction e®ect under consideration of AE; IE2: Introduction




L denote the LM
test for spatial error (E) and lag (L) dependence under the district (d) and neighborhood (n) weights
matrix; 1996 serves as reference; R2
adj is the adjusted degree of explanation; estimation based on 16097
observations. 15yields insigni¯cantly negative spatial spillover estimates. In contrast, under Wn the spatial lag
estimates become positive and signi¯cant if the spatial error structure is modeled by means of
Wd in the SARAR model or neglected in the SLM. However, as indicated by the respective
(substantially lower) log likelihood statistics this might be explained by a false speci¯cation
of the spatial error structure. Spatial dependence is also con¯rmed by means of a Lagrange
Multiplier (LM) test for spatial error (LME) and lag (LML) dependence (Anselin, 1988). Under
Wn and Mn, both tests are highly signi¯cant for OLS and the spatial models applying Wd and
Md. In summary, the results indicate spatial error dependence formalized by means of the
neighborhood spatial weights matrix as most appropriate to describe spatial patterns. This
¯nding underpins that hospitals which are in the same region have similar opportunities and
constraints (e.g. market characteristics, composition of patients, regional legal requirements)
implying spatial clustering of hospital e±ciency change. However, the values of the regression
coe±cients do not vary strongly across the models.
The results of the empirical testing strategy for H(A) reveal a negative e®ect of the DRG
announcement on hospital e±ciency change. Moreover, the negative announcement e®ect dom-
inates the overall e®ect (of the reform announcement and introduction), which also appears
to be negative. However, the DRG introduction (by itself) is found to have a signi¯cantly
positive e®ect on hospital e±ciency gains. The time e®ect estimates are, on average, signi¯-
cantly higher for the post-reform period (2004-2006) than for the pre-reform (1996-2003) and
post-announcement-pre-reform (2000-2003) period.5
4.2 Cross-sectional e±ciency
Log likelihood values for the cross-sectional regression models are reported in Table 3. The
SARAR model under Wd and Md obtains the highest statistics for almost all years and these
are signi¯cantly higher than their OLS counterparts. In contrast to the e±ciency change model,
5Noting that the increase in time e®ect estimates might be driven by poorly performing hospitals exiting the
market we address this issue by means of estimating a binary response model (Probit and Logit). The results
do not indicate a systematic and signi¯cant e®ect of a hospital's performance in period t on the probability to
exit the market in t+1 over the considered time periods. Therefore, we do not believe in a selection bias which
is responsible for the increased overall hospital e±ciency.
16the district based spatial weights matrix appears to be most appropriate to model the spatial
error and lag structure of hospital e±ciency.
Table 3: Comparison of cross-sectional models
year obs. OLS SEMj¸=0 SLMj½=0 SARAR
Wd Wn Wd Wn Wd&Md Wn&Mn Wd&Mn Wn&Md
1995 1355¡1003:4 ¡1002:9 ¡1003:1 ¡1003:3 ¡1003:2 ¡1002:5 ¡1003:1 ¡1003:1 ¡1002:7
1996 1359 ¡706:2 ¡706:0 ¡705:7 ¡705:9 ¡705:8 ¡705:9 ¡705:7 ¡705:6 ¡705:7
1997 1354 ¡373:6 ¡373:3 ¡373:3 ¡371:8¤ ¡372:1¤ ¡366:2¤¤ ¡371:9 ¡371:8 ¡371:8
1998 1430 ¡365:2 ¡365:0 ¡365:0 ¡363:6¤ ¡364:7 ¡359:0¤¤ ¡364:6 ¡363:6 ¡364:6
1999 1534 ¡362:3 ¡361:4 ¡362:2 ¡360:2¤¤ ¡361:7 ¡349:3¤¤ ¡361:1 ¡360:1 ¡360:6
2000 1544 ¡438:0 ¡437:7 ¡437:6 ¡437:0 ¡437:8 ¡432:6¤¤ ¡437:6 ¡436:9 ¡437:5
2001 1583 ¡646:9 ¡645:1¤ ¡645:4¤ ¡646:8 ¡644:9¤¤ ¡640:7¤¤ ¡644:8 ¡645:4 ¡642:7¤¤
2002 1653 ¡477:8 ¡473:4¤¤ ¡477:3 ¡473:7¤¤ ¡475:8¤¤ ¡447:1¤¤ ¡474:4¤¤ ¡473:1¤¤ ¡470:6¤¤
2003 1624 ¡516:6 ¡514:4¤¤ ¡516:4 ¡512:1¤¤ ¡514:9¤ ¡490:2¤¤ ¡514:3 ¡512:0¤¤ ¡512:1¤¤
2004 1632 ¡889:7 ¡887:1¤¤ ¡889:5 ¡889:1 ¡886:8¤¤ ¡877:1¤¤ ¡885:3¤¤ ¡889:0 ¡883:6¤¤
2005 1604 ¡845:6 ¡844:9 ¡845:3 ¡842:8¤¤ ¡841:2¤¤ ¡832:6¤¤ ¡838:8¤¤ ¡842:4¤¤ ¡840:2¤¤
2006 1549 ¡702:4 ¡702:2 ¡701:9 ¡697:5¤¤ ¡702:1 ¡684:8¤¤ ¡700:7 ¡696:6¤¤ ¡702:0
Signi¯cance level: ¤¤ 5%; ¤ 10%.
In the following, we examine the regression variables to explain the variation in hospital ef-
¯ciency. Similar to the panel model, the estimated coe±cients do not vary markedly across the
distinct model speci¯cations. Therefore, we concentrate on the results of the best ¯tting model
as indicated by the highest log likelihood statistics. Table 4 provides the regression results of
the SARAR model under Wd and Md. The estimation results reveal private hospitals to be less
e±cient than their public counterparts after 2001. This is in line with other empirical ¯ndings
(Herr, 2008, Farsi and Filippini, 2008, and Helmig and Lapsley, 2001). Before 2002 private
for pro¯t hospitals seem to be more e±cient than public hospitals. However, for most periods
the estimates are not signi¯cant. Interestingly, there is no convergence in e±ciency of private
hospitals to the public counterparts after the introduction of DRG. This result is in contrast
to the ¯ndings of Barbetta et al. (2007), who analyze hospital e±ciency in Italy. Since pro¯t
incentives are no longer associated with an ine±ciently long hospital stay (Herr, 2008), the
result rather supports a conjecture of Helmig and Lapsley (2001). They argue that local gov-





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18ones. Furthermore, a positive relationship between market share and e±ciency is found.6 The
relationship between specialization and e±ciency has changed over time. After 2002, a special-
ized hospital is, on average, less ine±cient in comparison with a non-specialized hospital. Due
to the ¯nancial reform a trend towards specialization (Knorr, 2003) and merger (Rocke, 2003)
is expected, which might lead to an increased market share of the involved hospitals. Thus,
the results support these strategies as promising options to increase hospital performance. The
occupancy rate has a signi¯cantly positive parameter estimate for most years, implying that hos-
pitals which are fully stretched are less ine±cient. Furthermore, high mortality and the budget
size are correlated with higher ine±ciencies, while hospital performance appears invariant with
regard to the age structure of the district's population. Noting that the estimated coe±cients
are mostly in line with ¯ndings of related studies (e.g. Herr, 2008, Farsi and Filippini, 2008,
Lee et al., 2008, Chang, 1998), we believe that the explanatory factors control appropriately
for heterogeneity among hospital performance and o®er the correct identi¯cation of potential
spatial dependence patterns.
Table 5 displays spatial parameter estimates for distinct model speci¯cations. Due to space
considerations, SARAR model results are only shown for speci¯cations with the same applied
pattern for the spatial lag and error dependence, since log-likelihood statistics do not indicate
an obvious priority to any speci¯cation, except to the choice of Wd and Md. First of all, the
results con¯rm the presence of negative spatial spillovers and positive spatial error correlation,
irrespective of the spatial weights matrix. The spatial parameter estimates of the restricted
models (SEM and SLM) are of a lower magnitude in comparison with the respective estimates
of the SARAR model. This might be explained by the fact of having only one channel of spatial
dependence in these models. Positive spatial error correlation mitigates the negative spatial
lag estimates and vice versa. Under Wd and Md, the SARAR model obtains signi¯cant spatial
parameter estimates for almost all years. If the broader concept of spatial contiguity is applied,
6Augurzky et al. (2006) mention the importance of the geographic area where the market share is built up.
In a rural area a higher market share can be the result of being the only provider of inpatient treatments leading
potentially to an ine±cient production of medical care, due to the lack of competitors. At the opposite, a higher
market share in an urban area can be the result of an e±cient performance. We incorporate an interaction of
the variable ms and an agglomeration dummy variable. However, there is no considerable di®erence between
the impact of rural or urban market share.
19Wn and Mn, estimated spatial parameters are larger in absolute value, but insigni¯cant until
2001.
Table 5: Spatial correlation estimates
year ^ ½j¸=0 (SEM) ^ ¸j½=0 (SLM) ^ ½ (SARAR) ^ ¸ (SARAR)
Wd Wn Wd Wn Wd&Md Wn&Mn Wd&Md Wn&Mn
1995 0:031 ¡0:098 0:008 ¡0:070 0:074 ¡0:087 ¡0:046 ¡0:010
1996 ¡0:018 ¡0:154 ¡0:018 ¡0:115 ¡0:002 ¡0:108 ¡0:016 ¡0:037
1997 0:019 ¡0:102 ¡0:055¤ ¡0:249 0:187¤¤ 0:152 ¡0:193¤¤ ¡0:350
1998 0:009 ¡0:062 ¡0:051¤ ¡0:128 0:176¤¤ 0:089 ¡0:186¤¤ ¡0:188
1999 0:042 0:045 ¡0:056¤¤ ¡0:165 0:225¤¤ 0:203 ¡0:220¤¤ ¡0:276
2000 0:022 ¡0:129 ¡0:038 ¡0:072 0:154¤¤ ¡0:125 ¡0:153¤¤ ¡0:000
2001 0:057¤ ¡0:305 ¡0:004 ¡0:296¤ 0:185¤¤ ¡0:105 ¡0:145¤¤ ¡0:227
2002 0:096¤¤ 0:148 ¡0:075¤¤ ¡0:291¤ 0:290¤¤ 0:294¤ ¡0:262¤¤ ¡0:410¤¤
2003 0:065¤¤ 0:042 ¡0:078¤¤ ¡0:262¤ 0:274¤¤ 0:192 ¡0:267¤¤ ¡0:356¤
2004 0:070¤¤ 0:066 ¡0:025 ¡0:375¤¤ 0:228¤¤ 0:303¤ ¡0:186¤¤ ¡0:578¤¤
2005 0:034 0:107 ¡0:062¤¤ ¡0:494¤¤ 0:205¤¤ 0:360¤¤ ¡0:199¤¤ ¡0:738¤¤
2006 0:012 0:132 ¡0:081¤¤ ¡0:091 0:237¤¤ 0:326¤ ¡0:248¤¤ ¡0:325
average spatial spillover estimates
¹ ¸1 (95-99) - - ¡0:034 ¡0:145 - - ¡0:132 ¡0:172
¹ ¸2 (00-03) - - ¡0:049 ¡0:230 - - ¡0:206 ¡0:248
¹ ¸3 (04-06) - - ¡0:056 ¡0:320 - - ¡0:211 ¡0:547
¹ ¸4 (95-03) - - ¡0:041 ¡0:183 - - ¡0:165 ¡0:206
¹ ¸5 (00-06) - - ¡0:052 ¡0:269 - - ¡0:208 ¡0:376
test statistics
¹ ¸1 > ¹ ¸2 (AE) - - 0:762 0:846 - - 2:462¤¤ 0:522
¹ ¸2 > ¹ ¸3 (IE1) - - 0:363 0:744 - - 0:146 1:817¤¤
¹ ¸4 > ¹ ¸3 (IE2) - - 0:859 1:293¤ - - 1:684¤¤ 2:280¤¤
¹ ¸1 > ¹ ¸5 (OE) - - 1:060 1:395¤ - - 2:857¤¤ 1:538¤
Signi¯cance level: ¤¤ 5%; ¤ 10%.
Finally, the diagnostic results of the SARAR model for H(B) are discussed in detail. For all
spatial speci¯cations, the magnitude of average spatial spillover estimates increases over time.
However, the test results di®er across the spatial weights matrices. Under Wd an announcement
e®ect of the DRG reform is identi¯ed while an e®ect of the DRG introduction is only detected
if the AE is neglected (IE2). This is in contrast to the results obtained under Wn. There
is no evidence for an e®ect in response to the announcement, but to the DRG introduction,
irrespective if the AE is taken into account (IE1) or not (IE2). However, under both spatial
20speci¯cations an overall e®ect is detected. In summary the results convey the expected rise of
competition for low cost patients invoked by the DRG reform.
The competition for low cost patients might have several e®ects. On the one hand, in order to
attract patients, hospitals have to acquire reputation by quality of care, service, room facilities
etc. On the other hand, hospitals treating patients with high complexities receive inappropriate
cost reimbursements and may experience solvency problems (BÄ ocking, 2005). To save costs they
might decrease the quality of treatment. Several studies (e.g. Perelman et al., 2008, Picone,
2003) ¯nd a positive relationship between social deprivation and the length of hospital stay,
e.g. due to higher complexities (Krieger et al., 1997). Thus, there might be a cost di®erential
between underprivileged and well-o® patients, which is not taken into account by the German
hospital cost reimbursement. This typically yields an implicit patient selection of the hospitals
with consequences on social equity in health (Perelman et al., 2008). To avoid such behavior,
Perelman et al. (2008) suggest to integrate the impact of socio-economic status on length of
stay to the cost reimbursement.
5 Conclusions
This study is the ¯rst approach that considers spatial interdependence of hospital e±ciency in
Germany for the period 1995 to 2006 that includes the announcement (2000) and introduction
(2004) of the DRG based ¯nancing system. In particular, two hypotheses about potential e®ects
of the ¯nancial reform on overall hospital e±ciency gains and spatial interdependence of hospital
performance are examined.
Accounting for observed and hidden hospital characteristics, we ¯nd an increased growth
of e±ciency after the DRG introduction. Noting that there have been no major exogenous
shocks a®ecting hospital e±ciency during the period of study, the results con¯rm the intention
of the reform to improve the e±ciency of the health care system. Furthermore, the results
reveal two distinct channels of spatial interdependence of hospital performance, i.e. positive
spatial error correlation and negative spatial spillovers. While the former could be explained by
similar opportunities and constraints of nearby hospitals, the latter might occur in response to
21competition between the hospitals. Moreover, the increase in the magnitude of negative spatial
spillovers is in line with an expected rise of competition for low cost patients invoked by the
reform of the ¯nancing system.
The increase of e±ciency after the introduction of the prospective payment system could
be achieved by opportunistic practices of the hospitals. For instance, they could refer cases
prematurely to other health care institutions (e.g. rehabilitation centers) or readmit the patients
(BÄ ocking et al., 2005). In order to account for such a behavior it might be important to
incorporate in the e±ciency measurement information about the quality of treatments and
hospital stay. Future research should consist in constructing adequate quality adjusted e±ciency
measures. Another important issue is to analyze the competitive behavior of the hospitals. The
increased negative spatial spillovers among hospital performance after the DRG reform might
be explained by an increased competition for low cost patients, implying the practice of patient
selection. The consequences for so called high cost patients are of particular interest in order
to derive policies for targeting an equal access to inpatient care.
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27A Calculation of DEA e±ciency scores
The estimated super e±ciency score, µV
i;tjt, is obtained under the assumption of variable returns
to scale (Banker et al., 1984) by solving the following linear program
µ
V































ºlt = 1; ºlt > 0 8 l = 1;:::;Ntg;
where qrit, xN
kit and xD
jit denote output, non-discretionary and discretionary input variables of
hospital i at time t. The numbers of outputs, non- and discretionary inputs, and reference
hospitals at time t are s, mN, mD, and Nt, respectively.
B ML estimation
Model (3) can be written as
BAe y = B
µ
















































and Bt = INt ¡ ½Mt, At = INt ¡ ¸W t. Assuming a multivariate normal distribution of the
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A and b At = INt ¡ ^ ¸MLW t.
C Construction of case mix weights
The more time the treatments of cases belonging to the j-th clinical department takes relative to
all other treatments, the higher the weight, ¼j, of the corresponding cases. Let cij be the number
of cases in the j-th clinical department of the i-th hospital at time t7. Then, the weighted cases





where ¼j = losj=losG, losj = (
PN
i=1 daysij=cij)=N is the mean length of stay for the cases
belonging to the j-th clinical department over all hospitals and losG = (
PJ
j=1 losj)=J is the
mean length of stay over all clinical departments and all hospitals at time t.
7For ease of illustration the time index t is neglected.
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